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
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2 October 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 2 October 1969

ADD/I called attention to the item by William Beecher on page 7 of today's New York Times, "U. S. Is Reviewing Spy Capabilities."




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

Godfrey noted that they received a requirement from Dr. Kissinger last evening for a paper on the twentieth anniversary of the ChiCom revolution, with an assigned suspense of 10 a.m. this morning.

D/ONE briefed on State's possible exceptions to paragraph 59 of NIE 11-3.

D/ONE provided those interested with additional written information on the distribution of NIEs.

Carver reported that he provided Colonel Haig with a written critique of the Vietnam story contained in the 19 September issue of Life.

X1  briefed on the scheduled Senate consideration of the Daniels retirement bill today.

In response to the Director's question  related that the Symington Subcommittee on foreign commitments abroad is relatively quiet except for one inquiry from State on communications, which is being handled by 

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X1 Parrott mentioned that he has been invited to participate in a training program for FSOs in December at the FSI. The Director approved.

DD/S&T noted completion of MIRV/SS-9 analysis and briefed on same.

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DD/S&T reported that OSI analysts have produced significant new information indicating that the Soviet C-Class submarine may have a speed in excess of 30 knots.

DD/P mentioned that Ray Cline will be returning here 25 October.

DDCI noted NIRB consideration of OPRED problems connected with [REDACTED]

X1

DDCI noted that he will be speaking to the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk tomorrow and will be returning here Monday morning.

The Director pointed to a Tan Yug news service report (FBIS-86) on Sino/Soviet border troop withdrawals.

The Director noted a report analyzing the attitudes of Kosygin and Chou toward SALT and went on to note the possibility that the Chinese could take an eleventh-hour position of being opposed to our sitting down with the Soviets.

The Director alerted Executive Committee members to the possibility that some elements of the press may try to re-create the Green Beret story in the weeks that lie ahead. He asked the DD/P to draft cabled guidance to the field.

[REDACTED]

L. K. White

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U.S. IS REVIEWING SPY CAPABILITIES

Assays Prospects if Soviet
Bars On-Site Arms Checks

By WILLIAM BEECKER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 1.—The Nixon Administration, as it approaches the start of talks on control of Strategic arms, is conducting an intensive review of all its espionage capabilities to determine what types of accords the nation can live with if on-site inspection cannot be negotiated.

Officials involved in the high-priority study say that while they are not foreclosing the possibility of working out a mutual inspection procedure with the Soviet Union, they would not want to see the talks bog down over that issue.

Consequently, they are attempting to find out with as much precision as possible the extent to which the United States could depend on unilateral means of gathering intelligence to show whether the Russians were abiding by various possible measures on arms limitation.

While stressing that the Administration does not assume that the Russians will cheat, one official insisted that it was only prudent to find out "just how sensitive our intelligence-gathering capabilities are to cheating."

More than 100 analysts at the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency are said to be participating in the review.

Appraisal of Power Balance

The review is focused on what the United States can count on learning from present and proposed spy satellites, eavesdropping planes and ships, radar, Soviet publications and spies and informers.

The study is also attempting to provide President Nixon with an appraisal of whether the strategic balance of power with the Soviet Union is a delicate one, subject to sudden undermining by some determined cheating, or is so well-based as to be difficult to upset.

As American officials view it, the key to the current balance is the continuing ability of each nation to deter the other from attacking by possessing sufficient protected missiles and bombers to be able to retaliate overwhelmingly. In this approach offense rather than defense is stressed.

The officials say it is by no means certain that Soviet leaders share that philosophy of strategy. This is expected to be one of the first points to be explored once talks begin on the limitation of strategic arms.

In general terms the United States seeks agreements that would freeze the number and size of intercontinental ballistic missiles, limit the scope of anti-missile systems, submarines and limit or even reduce the number of strategic bombers.

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Ranking officials say the study has pinpointed a number of key areas of uncertainty:

¶If the Russians agree to field only a thin antiballistic-missile system, can some of their large number of ground-to-air missiles be surreptitiously upgraded for attacking intercontinental ballistic missiles?

¶Once multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's) for ICBM's have been successfully tested, is there any way to monitor a ban on their deployment without taking a missile apart at an operational silo? Would either country agree to such "intrusive" inspection?

¶To what extent can spy satellites determine whether the Soviet Union tries to substitute bigger, better ICBM's in existing silos?

¶Can all the spying devices keep track of mobile ICBM's if the latter are not barred completely?

¶If the Russians put all their missile submarine construction under cover, as is not the case at present, could the United States still keep track of new construction?

The officials here point out that it was uncertainty over what the so-called Tallinn system was designed for that led several years ago to the decision to develop and deploy MIRV's, which are meant to overcome a heavy missile defense, thus preserving the American retaliatory capability. The Tallinn system involves ground-to-air missiles, which started appearing in northwestern Russia in 1964.

Many officials thought it was a new antimissile system, but intensive analysis over the years since has convinced them that it is simply a better defense against bombers.

A tentative conclusion of the study is that the balance of power would not be easily upset, the officials say. The United States maintains three strategic systems — Minuteman missiles, Polaris missiles and B-52 bombers — any one of which is believed to be strong enough to cause tens of millions of deaths in a second strike.

"This is the most comprehensive assembly of technical analysis on what we know and don't know in the intelligence field that has ever been done in Government," a high Administration official commented. "We think it will prove invaluable as we enter the drawnout debates over possible agreements with the Russians."